The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the biggest – and hardest – jobs in Washington. Colin Kahl served in that role for more than two years. From April 2021 to July 2023, he was the principal adviser to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin for all matters related to national security and defense policy, oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused on the “pacing challenge” posed by China, and he led the Department’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among other international crises. He also led other major defense diplomacy initiatives, like U.S. efforts to revitalize the NATO alliance.
Kahl has had a long career in government and public service. During the Obama administration, he served as Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Before that, he served in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East for nearly three years.
Just Security’s Co-Editor-in-Chief Tess Bridgeman recently sat down with Kahl, who is now a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, for an exit interview.
Show Notes:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the biggest – and hardest – jobs in Washington. Colin Kahl served in that role for more than two years. From April 2021 to July 2023, he was the principal adviser to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin for all matters related to national security and defense policy, oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused on the “pacing challenge” posed by China, and he led the Department’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among other international crises. He also led other major defense diplomacy initiatives, like U.S. efforts to revitalize the NATO alliance.
Kahl has had a long career in government and public service. During the Obama administration, he served as Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Before that, he served in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East for nearly three years.
Just Security’s Co-Editor-in-Chief Tess Bridgeman recently sat down with Kahl, who is now a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, for an exit interview.
Show Notes:
Paras Shah: The Under Secretary of Defense for Defense Policy in the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the biggest — and hardest — jobs in Washington. Colin Kahl served in that role for more than two years, from April 2021 to July 2023. He was the principal adviser to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin for all matters related to national security and defense policy, oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused on the “pacing challenge” posed by China, and he led the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among other international crises. He also led other major defense policy initiatives, like U.S. efforts to revitalize the NATO alliance.
Kahl has had a long career in government and public service. During the Obama administration, he served as Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden. Before that, he served in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East for nearly three years.
Hello and welcome to the Just Security Podcast. I’m your host, Paras Shah.
Just Security’s Co-Editor-in-Chief Tess Bridgeman recently sat down with Kahl, who is now a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, for an exit interview.
Here is Tess’ conversation with Colin Kahl.
Tess Bridgeman: Thank you so much for doing this. Colin, it's wonderful to talk to you today.
Colin Kahl: It's great to be with you again.
Tess: Let's get right to it with one that I think will be really informative for our listeners. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, you were a key player in shaping a myriad of defense policy issues, including all the ones that captured the headlines. But we all know that those aren't always the ones that you have the luxury of spending your time on. I was hoping to start with those. What occupied the most of your time in your role? What kept you up at night? And what do you wish you had been able to spend more time on?
Colin Kahl: Those are all great questions. Look, I think whenever you have these jobs, and essentially the — you know, for your listeners who don't know much about the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — the easiest way to think about it is, you're kind of the National Security Adviser to the Secretary of Defense. So you run the Secretary's national security staff, about 800 civilians, military contractors and others, and then some bunch of agencies and departments that report to you. It all adds up to about 3000 people that covers the entire waterfront of the kind of national security policy for the Pentagon.
So, you're responsible for everything and like those jobs elsewhere in the government, you end up inevitably drawn into whatever the crisis of the day is. So, you know, I took that position in the spring of 2021, after the President had made the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, but of course, then you had the collapse of the government in Kabul in August and the, you know, the frantic race to evacuate our embassy, American citizens and as many vulnerable Afghans as we could, but against, you know, a timeline. So that was obviously a hugely impactful and consuming experience. Those 17 days in August of 2021 were among the most intense in my life, I can imagine, you know, anybody who does a job like this.
And then we immediately pivoted from that to this kind of onrushing train that was the Russian invasion of Ukraine, because we had a bunch of intelligence suggesting that Putin was at least thinking about it, and was putting the pieces in place to do it. And we started mobilizing the international diplomacy around that, you know, really only about six weeks after the end of our involvement in Afghanistan. So those two things were pretty all consuming for the first year of my job.
And then periodically, things would pop up that just weren't on your bingo card, like, you know, the civil war erupts in Sudan, and suddenly, we have to evacuate our diplomats. Or while the competition with China was front and center for our foreign policy, and certainly at the Pentagon, none of us had, you know, a high altitude balloon on our list of things we thought we would have to deal with, too. So you know, it's pretty easy to get consumed day to day, and whatever the crisis is that's driving things.
The thing I'm proudest of is that we were able to kind of take a step back in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which my office oversaw, to really make sure that we were strategically thinking about how to effectively compete with China, basically, because China is the only country in the world that kind of has the military, diplomatic, technological, and economic wherewithal to challenge the United States as the world's most influential country, and also increasingly, the intention to do that, and displace the United States as the world's leading actor, and I think in ways that would be more compatible with their interests and the values of the Chinese Communist Party, and I think, in ways that would be highly problematic from a from a US national security perspective.
So, China was not a day to day crisis. I mean, I mentioned the high altitude balloon. There was of course then Speaker Pelosi, her visit to Taiwan, which created, you know, a spin up, but day to day, China actually wasn't the front burner crisis. And so really having the discipline to craft a strategy around how we needed to get serious about the pacing challenge that China posed, and kind of made sure that we were making the investments and doing the hard thinking about that, and I'm actually quite proud that we managed to do that even as we were managing all these other things.
Tess: So I was going to ask you about China a little bit later. But let's talk about that now, since you've brought up the National Defense Strategy and the pacing challenge, and I think many of our listeners will have heard you speak very eloquently about these issues while you were serving in your most recent role. So kind of stepping out now, with the luxury of a little bit of hindsight, here's a question that you may have thought about a lot, but maybe not had an opportunity to talk about as much. What are the areas of strategic cooperation that you see as possible or desirable? You know, you've talked about building guardrails and the problem of the other side not wanting to answer the phone. Obviously, the rhetoric, I think, on both sides probably doesn't help. If we could get past that, if we were in a moment of dialogue, what would be the areas of strategic cooperation that you think should be prioritized?
Colin: Well, I think, you know, the competition between the United States and China is not like the Cold War competition. China is not the Soviet Union, and our economies and societies are much more intertwined than was the case during the Cold War, and the world is more globalized, and our fate, as human beings, are more intertwined. So for that reason, there are a whole host of global challenges that, you know, both the United States and China need to address and it's in their interest to do that. And, you know, obviously, climate change is the one that pops to mind for most people, but it's not the only one. Global public health, including pandemics — obviously COVID-19 originated from China — and the inability of the United States and China to work together to help address that challenge, you know, made the global response to COVID less effective.
There are huge problems associated with, or huge risks associated with, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, of which the United States and China are the two leading actors. And so as you kind of think about international norms, rules, standards governing emerging technologies that will reshape all of our lives, you would think the United States and China have an interest in focusing on that.
And then, of course, as China goes through this process of quadrupling, or maybe even quintupling, its nuclear arsenal, and meanwhile, being quite assertive in domains like cyber and space and other things, the strategic stability implications of the US-China relationship are pretty profound. And so across all those areas, I would say, it would be a good thing if the United States and China could at least create some framework to have, you know, if not kind of in depth, cooperation, at least to be able to be moving the world in broadly a direction that is, you know, serves both countries’ interests in both and serves the broader interest of humanity.
I think the big debate — I don't really think in the administration, actually — but I think the big debate in the world is, can you compete and cooperate with China at the same time? And, you know, this administration believes that you can. I think the previous administration believed basically you couldn't, therefore you should compete and don't worry about cooperation. And I think the Obama administration mostly emphasized cooperation, and to be frank, we didn't emphasize the competitive aspect enough. Especially once Xi Jinping ascended in China, it became clear that we needed to compete more, because he was competing with us.
So I think that the Biden administration has tried to not be, you know, an Obama redux, but also not be Trump redux, but basically make an argument about whether you can compete and cooperate at the same time. And I think their argument is, look, we shouldn't have to accommodate things that are dangerous to our interests, or to international stability, to induce China to do things that are in their interests. Like, we don't need to give them, you know, to cede their view on certain issues, whether it be, you know, human rights in Xinjiang or Tibet, or their treatment of Hong Kong, or the challenges or the threat that they pose to the island of Taiwan, that we shouldn't have to see that position to Beijing to get them to cooperate on things like public health or climate change, because it should be in their interest to do those things.
And so this notion that we have to trade our interests away to get them to cooperate on things that should be in their interest doesn't make any sense. But what we can say is, even as we're competing with them, we will be open to dialogue and cooperation on these other issues. And I think that's what the administration has tried to do. It's been difficult, though. And, you know, there aren't a lot of channels of dialogue and communication. I think the administration is trying to rectify that.
The other position, I think, where competition and cooperation meet is that most cooperation, actually, as you know Tess, is the result of bargaining. It doesn't just happen out of thin air, it's actually a negotiation, it's it. And I think that what the Biden administration is doing is testing the hypothesis that we will be more effective ultimately in bargaining and negotiating with China if we bring as much of the other advanced economies and liberal democracies along with us. And so all the investments that have been made in our alliances and partnerships, especially with other advanced liberal democracies, are seen as a way of generating leverage vis-a-vis bargaining with Beijing.
So we'll see. I mean, hopefully I think the engagement that the administration is involved in now, more contacts, more channels of communication, that's good. I think they're hopeful they can set up a meeting between Xi Jinping and the President in San Francisco in November. Hopefully that happens, because there's a lot to talk about.
Tess: That's incredibly not only thoughtful, but hopeful. I'd like to think that there is a potential path for some forms of strategic cooperation. I think you're right, we hear about climate a lot, public health, strategic stability. It was interesting to me that you also mentioned technology, AI, the emerging technologies that don't have regulatory frameworks built around them yet, and obviously are the subject of really global concern as well as global promise. But it occurs to me that with respect to some of those technologies, in particular with the way that our respective governments and societies are structured, there may not be commonality.
Colin: Yeah, there may not be, in large part because more — in many ways, more than any of those other issues, the nature of our governments, institutions, values at home, matter very much for how we address it abroad. So in China's case, of course, the major concern that a lot of democracies have is that, you know, China is not only trying to dominate the commanding heights of technology and the infrastructure that undergirds that technology for economic benefit — they are doing that — but also because they want to make the highly interdependent world and the technology that underpins it safe for the CCP. And the concern there is that the enormous surveillance apparatus that they have created in China, the investments they've made in facial recognition, in using AI and machine learning algorithms for social control, the censorship they've imposed through the Great Firewall on the Internet, that they have built a extraordinarily sophisticated model of digital authoritarianism at home. And, I think the concern is that they will externalize that model. And so the more that they control 5G infrastructure, the more they can, you know, control undersea cables, the more they control the transfer of data in our space, and the more that they have access to the data and can shape the norms and standards around these technologies, they will do it in favor of more authoritarian mindset.
The United States has a different view. You know, we have our own debates within the democratic world. I don't mean that in terms of the Democratic Party, I mean, in terms of democracies, you know, the Americans, the Brits, other Europeans have different views on data privacy and these other issues. So there's a lot of there's a lot to be hashed out. But I think where there's a shared concern increasingly so is that we don't want a world in which China sets the rules on these technologies.
All of that said, AI in particular, especially generative AI, is one of these technologies that will shape our lives in ways that will be beyond the control of either the United States or China. And therefore, both countries should have some interest in putting guardrails around the technology, because neither one of us will be in control of that outcome. So I don't think a purely competitive frame deals with all of the downside risks.
Tess: That's a helpful framing of where we might have a path forward even on that incredibly contentious issue.
In the interest of time, let's pivot first to something very close to home, which is DoD as an institution. So you've spent a lot of time in the Pentagon, a very senior role, of course. You've also had the vantage point of the White House with your past experience. So you're intimately acquainted with what makes the institution tick, also perhaps its flaws. What do you think are some of the priorities that should be established, or reforms that could be undertaken, to make DoD the best version of itself?
Colin: Yeah, I mean, it's, it's a, it's a hard question because, as you know, Tess, DoD is not one bureaucracy, it's like six or seven of the largest bureaucracies in the US government. And even though I've now spent, you know, several years in three different tours of duty at the Pentagon, I wouldn't pretend to understand every nook and cranny of it.
I do think, though, if we're going to be successful as a country in rising to the challenge that China poses, that Russia poses, that others, you know, we have to do things differently at the DoD. And I think there's widespread recognition of that. Now, whether it can be actually implemented or not, is to be told to me. First, there has to be, you know, a much more sustained commitment to creating a different innovation environment. I think that is widely recognized among senior leadership at the Department in large part because so much of the innovation is now happening outside of government sponsored labs or R&D, or military investments, but it's happening in the commercial sector. And so how to bring those innovations in seamlessly and efficiently, how to identify technologies that actually don't have commercial applications, but are being developed outside of the government, and how do you bring them into government without having a two year budget cycle where these things, you know, wither on the vine during period some people call the valley of death.
So, you know, I'm really excited Doug Beck, who's the new head of the Defense Innovation Unit out here in California, you know, coming from a senior position at Apple, has a lot of great ideas, I think there's a lot of energy in the system around how to deepen cooperation with the commercial sector. I think the other two things I would emphasize are associated with the defense industrial base. You know, I think the war in Ukraine has reminded us of what it requires to actually sustain a high intensity war fight, even when we're not directly involved, but just supporting a partner involved. And I think it highlighted under investment in the United States and other countries in our defense industrial base, and in particular types of capabilities, especially munitions. And so we've got to fix that problem. And again, the administration is completely, you know, aware of that, and is making major investments, but they need to continue doing that, they need to get support from the Hill to do it.
The third is, I think that this is related, because it's also associated with the defense industrial base, is I think we need to increasingly think of the defense industrial base as a collective good of the free world. That is, we tend to think of it in terms of our understanding about our companies, our national companies, and what we sell overseas, and, you know, we compete with Israeli companies and French companies and British companies. I mean, we're all allies and friends, but we compete, and we will continue to do so. But I think we can't afford to have all of our national defense industries go off in different directions. And I think that, you know, our closest democratic and allies and partners, we need to find ways to increasingly cooperate with them. So we should be building a ton of chips in the United States, building as many as we can here, but we should also take advantage of the considerable capacity to do things like that in places like Japan or South Korea. There's a lot of opportunity to do things with India in the defense technology space. And so I think, and with our European partners, so and you know, I think we're exploring this through mechanisms like our arrangements with India, like things like AUKUS with the UK and Australia, but I think we need to do more of that of thinking about how we can rise, how we can elevate the defense industrial base across the democratic world in a way that's fitter for purpose in competing with China and Russia and others.
Tess: So while we have you, I can't help but ask this one question that I think for the lawyers in our audience will be close to their hearts.
So for those who are not lawyers, it's helpful to lay as a baseline that executive branch lawyering isn't usually litigating, although there are plenty of executive branch lawyers that do that, that walk into court and stand up and make arguments on behalf of the United States. But for lawyers that serve in departments and agencies, that lawyer the policy process and provide counsel to policymakers like you, what makes a good lawyer, in your view, after all of these tours of duty? And what are the most helpful things that a lawyer can do to make the policy process run smoothly?
Colin: Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, I had the benefit, in my latest tour at the Pentagon and working with Caroline Krass, who's the OGC at the Pentagon, and she had a similar role at CIA in the previous Democratic administration. And, you know, she was extraordinary and a great partner. And I think that one of the ways in which, you know, she was particularly effective is that she saw her job as being a problem solver, that yes, I mean, representing the Department in litigation and all sorts of other things and dealing with legal disputes that surface across the Department, but also trying to figure out how to, you know, credibly interpret the law in a way that was consistent with and furthered and enabled policy.
And I think sometimes, you know, fairly or unfairly, I think sometimes lawyers in the executive branch are seen as the folks who tell you, you can't do the things you want to do. And, you know, lawyers always have to follow the law. But I think, coming into these jobs is how do I partner with people in policy to be problem solvers, as opposed to just telling them they can't do things, and to be creative about how the law can be interpreted or policy can be adjusted consistent with the law, to enable things that are in the national interest?
And so being a partner with the policy process, I think maybe that sounds basic, but I'm not sure that every lawyer I've encountered, you know, saw their role that way.
Tess: Yeah, yeah. Well, we maybe have time for one parting thought. Anything that you take with you from your most recent tour that you'd like to see carried on, or that you hope remains a priority that maybe is flying under the radar, maybe something folks aren't focused enough on, at least as far as the headlines are concerned?
Colin: Yeah, look, it's less of an issue, and I would actually, I would just say something that, you know, you and I were both in the Obama administration until the very last day. And, you know, I was back in government only four years later. And I like to think I was paying attention in the four years in between. But what I did not fully appreciate — I mean, I understood it kind of intellectually, but what I didn't feel was how much harder the world is. It's a much more competitive place, the United States remains the world's most influential actor, but it's more important than ever that we bring others alongside us, that the challenges that we often were confronting even in the Obama administration still largely focused on the Middle East and terrorism issues, and I think, even though, you know, Russia was becoming assertive, obviously, they annexed Crimea, they started the separatist movement in the Donbass and Ukraine, they intervened in Syria — I don't think we had fully come around to understanding the challenge that they posed. You know, Xi Jinping became much more assertive in the South China Sea, East China Sea vis-a-vis, Hong Kong, Taiwan.
I think the writing was on the wall, but you didn't feel it in quite the same way. We certainly felt it at the beginning of this administration. And then you layer on other things that, you know — I’m obviously, I'm a Democrat. I was a political appointee in a couple of Democratic administrations. So I'm not, I'm not objective. But the Trump years were really, really hard on US leadership in the world, because we, the United States, managed to alienate many of the countries that we most need to be by our side to do everything. And so our alliances were pretty battered. And then, of course, you know, COVID happened, and that accelerated a lot of problems around the globe. It also, frankly, created enormous wear and tear on our bureaucracies.
So I say that, I say all of that, because the world just felt harder. Everything was harder, and the stakes seemed larger. And my response to that, or, you know, I think maybe what I would leave your listeners with, is to say that's why we need people to serve. Because the world is not getting any easier. It's getting harder and the problems are getting tougher, and we need the best and the brightest in our society to still be willing to serve. Because if we don't solve these problems, the future for your children, my children, could be pretty bleak. So if you're listening to this, I hope that a number of you step up and serve.
Tess: Thank you, Colin, very well said. Appreciate your time today.
Colin: Great to be with you.
Paras: This episode was co-hosted by me, Paras Shah and Tess Bridgeman. It was edited and produced by Tiffany Chang, Michelle Eigenheer, and Clara Apt. Our theme song is “The Parade” by Hey Pluto.
Special thanks to Colin Kahl. You can read Just Security’s coverage of the many issues discussed in this episode on our website. If you enjoyed this episode, please give us a five star rating on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen.