The Just Security Podcast

Crisis in Haiti

• Just Security • Episode 61

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Haiti’s crisis of gang violence and political dysfunction has been spiraling out of control. The number of reported homicides more than doubled last year to almost 4,800, and kidnappings soared to almost 2,500 cases. Sexual violence is rampant, and 313,000 Haitians have fled their homes.

In recent weeks, the crisis has reached new heights. While de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry was out of the country, the gangs took advantage and rampaged across the capital, Port-au-Prince. According to the United Nations, since the start of the year, the gangs have killed over 1,100 people and injured nearly 700 others. 

As the gangs roam freely, the United States and Caribbean countries – in a bloc called CARICOM – are trying to mediate a solution. The result thus far – though still unfolding – is that Henry has agreed to resign as soon as a transitional council of possibly 9 members is formed and an interim prime minister is chosen. But many questions remain about how that council and the interim prime minister will be appointed, which segments of Haitian society will be represented on it, and how a potential Kenyan-led international policing mission might go forward.

Where does Haiti go from here?

Joining the show to discuss the security situation in Haiti, and how policymakers in the region and around the world are addressing it, are Rosy Auguste Ducéna and Beatrice Lindstrom. 

Rosy is a human rights lawyer and Program Manager for the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) in Haiti and has testified before the U.S. Congress. Bea is a Clinical Instructor and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic. Prior to joining Harvard, she was the Legal Director of the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, which works to bring Haitian grassroots struggles for human rights to the international stage. 

Show Notes: 

Paras Shah: Haiti’s crisis of gang violence and political dysfunction has been spiraling out of control. The number of reported homicides more than doubled last year to 4,800, and kidnappings soared to almost 2,500 cases. Sexual violence is rampant, and 313,000 Haitians have fled their homes.

In recent weeks, the crisis has reached new heights. More than 1,200 people have been killed in gang violence this year alone. While de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry was out of the country, the gangs took advantage and rampaged across the capital, Port-au-Prince. According to the U.N., since the start of this year, the gangs have killed over 1,100 people and injured nearly 700 others. 

As the gangs roam freely, the United States and Caribbean countries – in a bloc called CARICOM – are trying to mediate a solution. The result thus far – though still unfolding – is that Henry has agreed to resign as soon as a transitional council of possibly nine members is formed, and an interim prime minister is chosen. But many questions remain about how that council and the interim prime minister will be appointed, which segments of Haitian society will be represented on it, and how a potential Kenyan-led international policing mission might go forward.  

Where does Haiti go from here?

Welcome to the Just Security podcast. I’m your host, Paras Shah. Co-hosting with me this episode is Just Security’s Washington Senior Editor, Viola Gienger.  

Viola Gienger: Joining the show to discuss the security situation in Haiti, and how policymakers in the region and around the world are addressing it, are Rosy Auguste Ducéna and Beatrice Lindstrom. 

Rosy is a human rights lawyer and Program Manager for the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) in Haiti and has testified before the U.S. Congress. Bea is a Clinical Instructor and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic. Prior to joining Harvard, she was the Legal Director of the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, which works to bring Haitian grassroots struggles for human rights to the international stage. 

Paras: Rosy, Bea, thank you so much for joining the show. Rosy, I want to start with you. Could you tell us about the situation on the ground in Haiti?

Rosy Auguste Ducéna: Yes, of course. Since February 2009, the situation in Haiti is very chaotic. Every single day, people are being killed, including police officers. People are being injured by bullets, including police officers as well. Several kidnappings are carried out. Violence is against women and girls are recorded. Ministries, consulates, companies, banks, small and medium-sized businesses, private home are set on fire after being looted. Two prison escapes are recorded and threaten to attack other prisons, both in the Ouest department and in other parts of the country, are made by gang members. People living in insecurity camp have to flee again, and new camps are formed.  

Alongside the women, children and people living with disabilities are also very affected by the situation that that I'm describing here. No schooling, poor parents, no training activities, nothing at all. But in all of this, the civilian and defenseless people are the victims. The state is also absent — there is no police on the streets. Ministries are not functioning. So today, what we can say is that the Haitian population in general is in danger, because the gangs are in power. And they want to show us that they are. 

Paras: Sounds like such a difficult situation. How are people protecting themselves.  

Rosy: As we said before, police officers are absent from the street and a little less than last week, but we do not see them in the civil places where they used to be. So Haitians decide to protect themselves by installing brigades in the road, and by organizing themselves into insecurity camps to get to know the residents. But what we must understand is that actually, these measures are not effective at all for their protection. They only allow them to flee when there are other attacks by gang members. 

Paras: Haiti has made news around the world in recent weeks. What do you see as missing in the local and the international coverage? Where are the gaps?

Rosy: By my point of view, I would say that the media do not talk enough about the violence suffered by women, girls and people living with disabilities. And also, we need to mention that some of the media present the situation, saying that the gang members are themselves revolutionaries, when in fact we, among the defenseless population, are being killed, kidnapped, and raped by them every single day. 

Paras: Thank you so much for that overview.  

Viola: Bea, you give us a brief rundown on how the situation got to this point? 

Beatrice Lindstrom: The situation we're seeing, I think, is a political crisis as much as it's a security crisis, and the roots of it extend beyond Haiti’s borders. It was widely predicted that we reach this point by many, both inside and outside of Haiti. For over a decade now, leaders associated with the PHTK party (Pati Ayisyen Tèt Kale) have consolidated power by eroding state institutions and undermining the rule of law. They've been failing to hold elections, interfering with independent state institutions, and so on. And the result of this is, as Rosy described, a complete absence of accountable state actors. 

Meanwhile, I think political and business elites have also colluded with the gangs to further their own strategic interests, including through the financing and arming of gangs. And they've also looked the other way in the face of brutal massacres and the kidnapping of civilians that has resulted in a culture of impunity across the country. And yet despite this, the political leaders have enjoyed steadfast support from the international community, especially from the United States government, which has seen them as key to short-term stability in Haiti. I think Prime Minister Ariel Henry is a prime example of this. He was essentially appointed to take up the role as de-facto Prime Minister by the Core Group, which is a diplomatic coalition of foreign governments that's led by the United States, shortly after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in 2021. 

And so, Henry is somebody who does not have democratic legitimacy or popular support in Haiti. And since 2021, there has been significant civil society pressure on him to share power and to step down from his role. But until recently, he's been able to hold on to power because the United States and others have supported him. And so, it was only when the gangs seized on him being out of the country and carried out these violent assaults against major institutions in Haiti that we saw over the last couple of weeks that the international community shifted its tune and pressured him to resign, leaving a complete power vacuum that the gangs are now filling.

Viola: Thank you very much. That was a really good rundown. Rosy and Bea, can you tell us a little bit more about these gangs? How many are there? How united are they? What about this Jimmy Chérizier, who’s known as Barbecue, and the name of his gang, I gather, is the G9 and family gang. Tell us a little bit more about who they are, how they operate, how united or divided they may be?

Rosy: Well, it's not going to be easy, but as we know, until now, the latest estimations which we did back a long time, speak of more than 200 armed gangs operating here in Haiti. Each of them has hundreds of people, including minors, but we don't have specific information about the number of minors operating with the gangs’ member. And then we also need to say that the G9 is a coalition of civil armed gangs and Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, is a former police officer. We used to have two main coalitions, G9 and G-PEP. And before this federation, this new federation, they used to be one against another. So, since the federation that we have called today, Viv Ansanm, they are all together.

Bea: The G9 coalition is one that's enjoyed support from the PHTK party, including former President Michel Martelly. It’s a coalition that really surged in power starting in 2018 under former President Jovenel Moïse, when there was a massive anti-corruption movement that swept the country, and this movement presented a real threat to business interests and political leaders. And it's well documented, at this point, that there was collusion between the G9 coalition and both state and private actors as these gangs carried out targeted massacres in impoverished neighborhoods that also served as opposition strongholds, and where a lot of the organizers of this anti-corruption protests were based. And so, they carried out these horrific massacres that Rosy’s organization, RNDDH, took the lead in documenting. 

In recent years, the gangs have transformed into much more professionalized, more independent actors. And so, where there was a lot of collusion with state actors and business elites, I think they now have become more powerful in their own right, and they're less reliant on that patronage. And that also, in turn, makes it harder to figure out how to respond effectively to the gangs.

Viola: Great, that's really helpful background. Have all of the gangs been calling for Henry to resign? And if not, what was the nature of the divisions in that, if any? How does this demand for Henry to resign track with the long-standing belief, among civil society and many others, that they're actually working and colluding with Henry and his predecessors? Help us get a grip on that.  

Rosy: It seems to us that the men of the gang members, the gangs, actually, they were calling for Henry to resign, since the coalition came together into this federation, talking for all of them, this federation that I just talking about. But first of all, here in Haiti, armed gangs operate like mercenaries. They change their positions, considering those who will give them better offers. But, let's make it clear, we are still talking about the use of armed gangs to be and to stay in power. The fact is only that, today, they decide to change their political position.

Second of all, something that maybe people never mentioned since this chaotic situation is the fact that in December 2023, the judge of investigation on Jovenel’s assassination case arranged hearings for the authorities in their office, among them are Ariel Henry. None of them were charged. We are not saying today that they should have been. But it is just to mention that all those who were charged used to be collaborators of Jovenel Moïse, as well as his wife. This may be more than enough for the gangs to be activated to throw Ariel Henry. However, we also have to underline that contrary to what is being said, Ariel Henry was just abandoned by the international community, which is tired of him and his repeated lies.

Bea: I think it's important to also note that the calls for Henry to resign didn't originate with the gangs. There has long been calls from Haitian civil society for Henry to step down and to make the way for a more inclusive political transition. But where peaceful voices were largely ignored outside of Haiti, I think it's the gangs’ violent assaults recently that led the international community to finally withdraw that support from Henry, and once they did, he no longer had legs left to stand on. 

As Rosie noted, the relationship between the gangs and political leaders has always been instrumental in nature. The gangs are not necessarily driven by a particular political vision so much as they are in securing their own economic power.

Viola: What do the gangs ultimately want? Bea, you mentioned they're grasping for economic power, ultimately. Is there any way to engage them at all in negotiations? Or are their demands so prohibitive and criminal and self-serving that the only option is to somehow suppress and sideline them?

Rosy: By our point of view, the gangs’ members want to be seen as part of the political solution. But for us in RNDDH, there is no way to engage in negotiation with criminals. At the beginning, I said that since February 29, the situation has been chaotic in Haiti. But in fact, what we are experiencing did not start only until February, as Bea actually mentioned it. Armed gangs injured, kidnapped, killed and raped us for a long time. They have stolen houses and burned citizens’ properties. Even today, they continue, and for us, they must be prosecuted and sentenced.

Paras: I want to switch gears slightly and talk about what could come next. So, on March 11, Henry said that he would resign as soon as a transitional presidential council is formed, and an interim prime minister is chosen. What is the status of that at the moment, and what could representation look like on that council?

Bea: The plan officially emerged out of a meeting that was held last week in Jamaica. It was organized by CARICOM, the Caribbean Community with the United States and Canada and other foreign governments participating. Haitian civil society and political leaders also participated over Zoom. But the extent to which Haitians led the discussion is unclear. And the plan that emerged from this is a transitional council of seven voting members and two observers that are drawing members from different political parties and sectors of Haitian society. They were initially given a 24-hour deadline to submit their members, but there has since been a bit of a breakdown in the process. So, one of the parties that are meant to be represented on the council has some ties to the gangs, has dropped out, kind of rejecting the entire process. And there is another group that's affiliated with Ariel Henry that has so far failed to select a single member for the council. 

And so, the negotiations are very much ongoing. Secretary of State Blinken recently said that he expects that the council will be formed in coming days. Well, we'll see if that actually is what plays out. And once this council is in place, the idea is that they will be tasked with selecting an interim president and government, and eventually, that that government will then organize elections in coming years. 

But as for who is actually calling the shots behind the scenes, it's a bit unclear. The United States is very much insisting that this is a Haitian led process. But it's also important to note that there were several conditions that were placed on members’ participation in the government, and one of them is that they must support the invitation of a foreign security force. And this is something that has been very controversial in Haiti. And I think, regardless of the merits of sending in such a force, it's quite problematic to have foreign governments dictate that a condition to joining even an interim government is that they have to be in support of this multinational force.

Paras: And speaking of the idea of a Haitian led process, who would be credible to the Haitian people?

Rosy: So, rather than saying names, we want to paint their picture. And for us, the ones who want to be in the council, or if they want to be a candidate for any position in the future, they must be honest, not corrupted, not involved in gangs, activities, or transnational crimes. They must have never been convicted, and they must be well known by the population. 

Viola: Okay, that's really good, and laying down some framework there of what would be acceptable. Let me get back, Bea, to the question of the multinational security mission. That is something that got the okay from the UN Security Council, but it's not going to be an actual UN structure, and Kenya is supposed to lead that. What is the status of that right now? What are the odds of that coming together anytime soon?

Bea: The force was initially authorized by the UN Security Council back in October, but it's been on hold for some time now amid legal challenges in Kenya, and also in light of a lack of international funding that's been holding the force back. And then, more recently, on March 12, Kenya announced that the force would not deploy until there's a government in place in Haiti that the force could collaborate with. 

I think there's been a lot of concern about the effectiveness and accountability of this mission, both inside and outside of Haiti. As you note, although it was authorized by the UN Security Council, it's not structured as a UN peacekeeping force because of a perceived need for a robust use of force, but it's going to be staffed entirely by other governments. And so, Kenya has agreed to lead the force, and a number of Caribbean governments have also pledged troops as well as, I believe, Benin.

It is going to be operating pursuant to direct agreements with the Haitian government. But of course, this raises questions is in turn since there is not currently a government in place. And so, the document that we have to fall back on is the authorizing resolution from the UN Security Council. The resolution, I think, is a good start. It has very strong human rights language. It calls for compliance mechanisms and oversight bodies to ensure that the troops are operating in accordance with human rights law and with principles that are consistent with UN peacekeeping principles. 

And yet, as far as I know, the rules of engagement of the force are not public. And so, it's unclear exactly what powers this force would have to engage in force to make arrests, what measures would be taken to ensure that the right people are being shot at. But I think the devil will really be in the details here. And so far, those details are lacking.

Viola: Thank you. And you did write a very good piece for us on that pretty recently. So, I recommend that to our listeners here. Rosy, what is your sense of whether any kind of mission like this could work? Haiti has an unfortunate history of international peacekeeping and various other kinds of security missions that were not successful. What do you think about this one?

Rosy: So unfortunately, we have a very long history with international, multinational, or UN forces here. And unfortunately, the results are not good at all. And today, our point of view is that firstly, even if the UN is trying to put into our head that the force will not be a UN force, on the field, it will be considered like a UN force because we need it, firstly, to have this resolution from UN Security Council to allow this force to come here in Haiti.  

The second thing is that we think, if this force will have the same interlocutors who are those implicated in the human rights violations here in Haiti, they will not succeed. They will not be effective on the field.

Bea: The main prior peacekeeping force in Haiti, MINUSTAH, had a record of using excessive force in its interventions. There was one instance where MINUSTAH unleashed 22,000 bullets, 78 grenades and five mortars that killed more than 20 women and children in their homes. That's just one example. MINUSTAH was also notorious for committing sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children, and also introduced a devastating cholera epidemic to Haiti that killed more than 10,000 people and counting. 

And accountability for each of these scandals has been a struggle. There has yet to be remedies for the people who were injured in these abuses. And so, against that background, the idea of another foreign force, especially one that is operating outside of the UN’s framework, it sets off a lot of concerns within Haiti. And I think that this force is going to have to do a lot of work to gain the trust of the Haitian population as a credible force for security and human rights.

Viola: Both of you have mentioned, in the course of our discussion here, the civil society position. And civil society did get together after Henry to power, and after the assassination of Moïse, and put together a plan called the Montana Accord. And there was a fair amount of unity within civil society about that. Rosy, what is the situation now? How unified, do you have a sense of, is civil society, and are there some political parties on board? Are you still pursuing the Montana Accord as a good solution or trying now to focus on this transitional council? 

Rosy: to talk about the unity, about unity here in Haiti — the first thing that we need to mention is that actually, Haiti is a very polarized country. There are no several united groups. For instance, over the past 10 years, more than 300 political parties have been formed. And we don't really know about the number of civil society organizations. And in our point of view, this is, because of this polarized situation, that we think the Montana Accord used a transparent and inclusive mechanism, which allows it to be a conceptual tool, which can make it possible to find Haitian solution to the crisis here in Haiti, actually. And important points, like the way they want to have this political transition, strategy cases like the fight against corruption, particularly the PetroCaribe scandal, and various massacres were included in this accord. 

And something else that we need to mention is that civil society organizations, political parties, and individuals signed this accord. Unfortunately, the international community chose not to give any attention to this agreement, and also to its mechanism. And we all just lost more than 20 months while the human rights situation is worsening every day. 

And let's be clear. Today, Haiti needs very sincere friends more than ever, to listen to civil society organizations, to support good governance, and the rule of law, of course, and to do the fight against impunity and corruption. So today, all these friends, I mean, Haiti friends keep saying that they support all of what I just said. But here in Haiti, we are much more concentrated on this council, because we hope that maybe we will find a solution. 

Viola: In light of the security situation there, of course, the big question is, what has been the role of the Haitian police force, and there are several thousand members, I believe, of the Haitian police force. Some of them, I gather, had been involved with the gangs, or the gangs have infiltrated the police. But to what extent are there members of the police force in such significant enough numbers that a new credible government could work with, or that an international force could work with constructively? Rosy, what do you think?

Rosy: Today, the police have been weakened for several years, actually, by those governing the country. And they have been weakened while the authorities chose to strengthen the gangs by giving them money, ammunitions, and guns. So, in our point of view, today we need to reinforce this police, because in the UN Security Council Resolution, it said clearly that the police will need to work with the force coming. And by our point of view, this police, this force, national force that we have here on the field, will not be able to take over security if it is not reinforced.

Paras: What factors should the Biden administration consider as it shapes its response to the situation in Haiti? 

Rosy: The best recommendations that we can have for the American administration is to listen to civil society organizations, to support good governance and the rule of law, as well as the fight against impunity and corruption. Knowing that Haiti is a non-industrialized country, knowing that we have no arms, we have no ammunition factories, and knowing that the arms and ammunitions come for the most part from the United States, we also think that the American administration could then help us in controlling what leaves USA to enter here in Haiti.

Bea: The Biden administration has been adamant that they support a Haitian-led solution to the crisis. But the CARICOM meeting that we saw last week, and in particular, some of the conditions that were placed on participation in the government, suggests that they still have a very heavy hand in what happens next in Haiti. I think if there's one thing that this crisis teaches us, it should be that we also need to take a critical look at the US’s own policy towards Haiti, in particular, the way that the United States tends to prioritize short term stability over true democracy, and that often over the strong objection of Haitians. 

The Montana Accord is a good example of this. Despite having broad based support in Haiti, it never gained the support of the international community. And I think that was largely because many saw the timelines as being too drawn out, and that there was not enough of a kind of quick focus on elections, and that this would lead to upheaval. And yet, here we are almost three years since Henry being put into power. There has been no elections. I think the security situation right now would not allow for elections to happen anytime soon. And so, I think we need to learn from that past and have that inform a policy that truly makes way for Haitian actors to determine their future not just in name only, but in practice. 

And perhaps one additional note is that while all of this is undergoing, the US is also intercepting and returning refugees to Haiti who are escaping this really severe security situation that Rosy described. In this time of crisis, the United States needs to comply with its international law obligations as it relates to accepting asylum seekers from places like Haiti. And that should be a priority over catering to political considerations in advance of the elections.

Paras: Zooming out beyond Washington, what should the UN Security Council consider as it formulates its response? 

Bea: So far, the UN Security Council's response to Haiti has focused on targeted sanctions against specific individuals, as well as the deployment of this non-UN multinational security force. There are serious challenges to the ability of the multinational security force to be effective in this environment. The Haitian National Police is deeply eroded. It's a force that has not been paid in a long time. The remaining police officers that are still contributing services to the police are operating under extremely difficult conditions. And yet, others have since joined the gangs or are colluding with gangs in different ways. And so, this is quite a complex environment that the force is trying to enter, where it's not as simple as collaborating with the police against the gangs, but rather trying to navigate a very complex environment. 

And I think in this context, things like human rights, due diligence becomes especially important. The force is also going to need significant tactical expertise to know how to respond to the gangs that have built up quite a lot of strategic expertise. And so, as the Security Council deliberates this force, I think being transparent about the parameters that the force will be operating under is extremely important. This is not a situation where shooting first and asking questions later is going to help foster an environment of either security or rule of law. And I think ultimately, it’ll only sow more discontent within Haiti. And so, I think the Security Council owes it to the Haitian people to play an active role in ensuring that if this force does deploy, that it does so in a way that is consistent with human rights and that it is in fact actually paired with true support for a democratic process to play out.

Viola: Thank you very much, Bea and Rosy. And Rosy, I just wanted to close out by asking you whether you have any, any other thoughts, anything else that we should keep in mind as this really tragic scenario unfolds in your country.

Rosy: The fact that, the most important fact is to remind that here, people are dying. We are dying. And we need help. We need it right now.

Viola: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Paras: Rosy, Bea thank you so much for joining the show and sharing your insights with us. We'll continue to track developments in Haiti on Just Security. Rosy, we hope you remain safe. And our thoughts remain with Haiti. Thank you again. 

Rosy: Thank you. 

Bea: Thank you.

Paras: This episode was co-hosted and produced by me, Paras Shah, and Viola Gienger with help from Clara Apt. Our theme song is “The Parade” by Hey Pluto. 

Special thanks to Rosy Auguste Ducéna and Beatrice Lindstrom. You can read all of Just Security’s coverage of Haiti, including Rosy and Bea’s analysis, on our website. If you enjoyed this episode, please give us a five-star rating on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen.

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