The Just Security Podcast

Key Trends and Takeaways from the 2024 U.N. General Assembly’s High-Level Week

• Just Security • Episode 84

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More than 130 world leaders just completed a week of meetings in New York for the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly. This high-level week, as it’s called, began with States adopting U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' "Pact for the Future,” a key document generated as part of the "Summit of the Future."  

The goal of the Summit, and the pact, is to recharge the idea of global cooperation, which is facing severe strain amid competition between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Russia and China and their allies on the other. The U.N. meetings also occurred as conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, Sudan, and Myanmar, to name just a few, are killing tens of thousands of people and displacing millions. 

What were the key outcomes from the Summit of the Future and how might it shape future global diplomacy? And how can the U.N. more broadly remain relevant amid such geopolitical tensions? 

Co-hosting this episode is Just Security’s Washington Senior Editor, Viola Gienger. 

Joining the show to assess the high-level week and the Summit of the Future is Richard Ponzio. 

Richard is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Stimson Center’s program on Global Governance, Justice & Security.

Show Notes:  

Paras Shah: More than 130 world leaders just completed a week of meetings in New York for the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly. This high-level week, as it’s called, began with States adopting U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' "Pact for the Future,” a key document generated as part of the "Summit of the Future." 

The goal of the Summit and the Pact is to recharge the idea of global cooperation, which is facing severe strain amid competition between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Russia and China and their allies on the other. The U.N. meetings also occurred as conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, Sudan, and Myanmar, to name just a few, are killing tens of thousands of people and displacing millions. 

What were the key outcomes from the Summit of the Future and how might it shape future global diplomacy? And how can the U.N. more broadly remain relevant amid such geopolitical tensions? 

This is the Just Security Podcast. I’m your host, Paras Shah. Co-hosting with me today is Just Security’s Washington Senior Editor, Viola Gienger. 

Joining the show to assess the high-level week and the Summit of the Future is Richard Ponzio. Richard is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Stimson Center’s program on Global Governance, Justice & Security. 

Richard, thanks so much for joining the show. We're so excited to have you here and to share your expertise as we recap the latest edition of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Richard Ponzio: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to participate in this discussion with Just Security.  

Paras: So, I want to get started by talking about the negotiations on U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' Pact for the Future, which apparently was quite contentious. The negotiations ran right down to the wire. What turned out to be the main points of disagreement among states, and what do you think will be the impact of the final document?

Richard: Thank you. To start, the Antonio Guterres-led initiative, through his Our Common Agenda, has resulted in a consensus-based document from 193 U.N. member states, this Pact for the Future, the chief outcome. Two associated instruments that I'm sure we'll talk about in greater detail today, the Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations, were also two important outcomes.  

And, you know, it was not a given, including — I think we'll talk about some of the eleventh hour theatrics involving Russia and a group called the like-minded group of member states, who really sought to thwart and undermine and erode the outcome and possibly not even allow us to get across the finish line a week ago in New York on the on the 22nd and 23rd of September. So, the backdrop was that, you know, it wasn't a given that there was going to be over 130 heads of state that came together in New York to reinvigorate global cooperation. 

You know, the stated aims were threefold: to rebuild trust in and address gaps in global governance, to refer both the charter and major instruments that this process was intimately seeking to reinforce, namely the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Climate Agreement. But I think it's the third area that caught most of our attention: renewing the multilateral system. A lot of the ideas in what's called Chapter 5, transforming global governance, institutional change, other kinds of innovative approaches and tools to global governance, that was really quite what is new alongside these two instruments, the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration of Future Generations.

 I know in our discussion today we'll get into the geopolitical context, the backdrop, but that rebuilding trust, it is so hard to say with a straight face that, oh, the summit has made headway, because during the event, we saw the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, not only the continuation in Gaza with Israel, but inflammation of the fighting, culminating in the assassination of the leader of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Nobody knows where this is going. It would bring in Iran, the United States, other major powers — quite a conflagration to juxtapose against this really otherwise historic — I wouldn't say historic, but significant milestone meeting that the Summit of the Future represented. 

Reaffirming, though, all kinds of past commitments, the one that the Global South, developing countries will look at the most though, hey, you've made commitments again and again on financing for development, on climate financing over the past 10-15, years, but we haven't seen that materialize. The debt problem — including thanks to the pandemic, but there were problems there before the pandemic — have only grown in recent years. The shortfalls to delivering on the 2030 Agenda are astronomical. According to the U.N.'s own studies, $2.5 to 4 trillion local domestic financing coupled with foreign aid.  

But it's this third category where I think we have a lot to build upon, because there were 56 actions and associated commitments agreed to in the Pact for the Future, and there were equally a number of important actions and commitments in the two other instruments, and those are areas that I think we have now momentum to build upon, not only working within the constraints of the current system and following the letter of the agreements, but using it as a springboard to more ambitious ideas that don't even fall into the current documents. I think, if the trajectory is one of change, renewal, modernization, governments are sovereign, and they can determine, hey, we didn't go quite far enough in the year 2024 and with an eye to the next U.N. Secretary-General selection in 2026. Starting in 2027, there could be a whole new ballgame that emerges as a result of, as I said a minute ago, this significant milestone that the international community has just achieved. 

Viola Gienger: So, you do think there's going to be a tangible effect as a result of this document that was finally agreed?

Richard: Absolutely, and I would love to explore with you today, chapter by chapter, where I think some of the big ticket, high impact global governance innovations are. Some of them are quite buried beneath the reader, because of the nature of multilateral diplomacy. You know, if they only reaffirm past commitments, then I think the whole process would be exposed, and there would be questions about what was all the time, effort, consultations there were. 

To the credit of the U.N. and the key co-facilitators, from Germany and Namibia for the main Pact for the Future, but also the Jamaican and Dutch governments for the Declaration on Future Generations, in Sweden and Zambia, for the Global Digital Compact — the outreach and ideas that fed into this process were unprecedented in many ways we haven't seen on such a scale, maybe comparable to the 2030 post-2015 development agenda and that period, 2012 to 2015. But the fact is, this is a whole set of issues about changes in the international system, upgrading the machinery, and we can go chapter by chapter now across these 56 actions, and even explore detailed commitments within those actions, that are at least creating hope and a key message today, putting wind in the sails of at least a dozen, probably more, different committees and processes. 

Some exist — the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform or the ad-hoc working group on G.A. revitalization, the General Assembly — these have been around for years, but they're now going to have new impetus. Not since the 1960s have we seen ambitious language now adopted by more than 130 heads of state. Other countries have signed on as well to reconfigure and upgrade the Security Council representing today's geopolitical realities, even curbing the use or misuse of the veto power. The same can be said across the other major organs of the U.N. The General Assembly could initiate its own resolutions to bring about some new innovations and changes on instruments where they don't exist or there needs to be new processes. 

And finally, the Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations, they have their own review processes coming. And it's through those review processes, through the Secretary-General's careful analysis of progress since this last week's summit, and then when the member states convene again to assess what steps have been taken, both within countries, but most importantly, collectively, across the international system — that's when we're going to see the rubber hitting the road. The real measure of success won't begin for at least another year, but in U.N. multilateral terms, that's a very short amount of time, and it's about holding governments accountable now to advance progress in very tangible ways.

Viola: Yeah, I mean, you mentioned a lot of processes that will unfold from this, but concretely, what is perhaps the most surprising, concrete outcome that is likely to result from this? Just one. What would be the most surprising result that people may see from this, in your estimation?

Richard: Yeah, and, you know, while I think there are some bigger ticket, structural changes that really aren't talked about in the Pact for the Future but could be catalyzed down the road, in terms of what is holding to the letter and the spirit of what was agreed upon, I know we're going to turn later to the Global Digital Compact, and there are a few governance innovations there of really important discussion, because too few countries are even involved in artificial intelligence, let alone cyber governance issues — but I would like to highlight what speaks to the far majority of countries, the developing world. 

The G77 is the group of how they organize themselves on questions, especially around financing for development, a term that was mentioned more than two dozen times in the document, SDGs financing and the broader financing for development and climate finance agenda. But in more concrete terms, Actions 48 through 52 — six concrete set of actions on all aspects of international financial architecture reform. This is unheard of for a U.N. document. Never in the history of U.N. reform efforts have we seen this level of detail and this much reference to the World Bank, the IMF, the so-called international financial institutions, also multilateral development banks, references to the world trade system, although the language about the G20 has been lifted and taken out, at least, it was in the spirit of the conversation these last two years. And everybody knows the powerful informal grouping of states known as the G20 and bringing them closer, specifically in Action 48.  

I'll read to you the language that seems innocuous and not too detailed, to put it mildly, but it has the potential to be the vehicle for driving these concrete six actions and ensuring that new voices from the Global South, from civil society, that are usually not part of these conversations of reforming the international financial architecture, will be able to drive change. That's the notion of “a biennial summit at the heads of state and government level to strengthen existing and establishing more systemic links in coordination between the U.N. and the international financial institutions,” and “we stress the need for inclusive participation.” It's seemingly something people could skim over. What is this biennial summit? But go back to the originating document of this whole process, the Our Common Agenda in September of 2021, by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. And he writes at length about this biennial summit of the global economy, bringing the G20, bringing the IFIs together. 

If it's taken to its logical conclusion — and this is the same for so many of the actions we could set up, even informally at the beginning, but some kind of network secretariat to prepare for the agenda every two years when the General Assembly takes place — this will be an incentive for the most powerful governments on the planet to have their head of state or head of government represented in New York. That's no small feat. In recent years, only four out of five of the P5, the permanent members of the Security Council, were showing up. Major countries like Germany, led by Chancellor Merkel, would only come very infrequently over her 16 years as the head of state of her country. This will give an incentive to engage on the toughest issues of the day, where their countries have the most clout. These discussions have been taking place outside and separate from the U.N., so if we're really serious about building a more coherent global economic governance system that's synced up with environmental and social issues, mechanisms and innovations, I would call like the biennial summit on a global economy are an important step in that direction.  

There are other examples dealing with responses to food insecurity, energy insecurity, lots of lessons coming out of the pandemic of recent years, and I would love to address those. But section by section of the report, action by action, there are a number of gems, what we call high impact global governance innovations, that, if there is serious follow-through just in these next 12 months, then we can point to the fact that this significant milestone that I referred to, the Summit of the Future, also represented a historic turning point in some ways, rather than a historic footnote that we're going to quickly forget. 

Viola: But as an outsider looking at this, it still sounds like a lot of process, and, you know, creating yet another U.N. institution of some sort, you know, another U.N. office. Does this really signal something, you know, a concrete takeaway in the near future? And I know near future is long-term in U.N. terms, but just, you know, I think a lot of U.N. skeptics, obviously would question the idea of more process and more meetings and more, you know, institutions to do this, that and the other, and question is, what concretely changes?

Richard: What concretely changes? You take the overarching agreement for Paris, from 2015, the important climate agreement, and indeed, we see overall, the world has moved from a path towards 4.3 degrees Celsius warming of the planet to somewhere in the 2.5-to-2.7-degree range. But the scientists, through the International Panel on Climate Change, have warned repeatedly that we have to take seriously a heating up of the planet no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius since the start of the Industrial Revolution over 200 years ago. So yes, governments can make agreements, but there's so much into the structural transformation of our economies that are required. And so many of the countries that weren't even the main emitters that contributed to global warming, they’re on the front lines, they’re the most vulnerable, low-lying countries, small island developing states.  

And so, issues around climate finance, mitigation and adaptation to prepare and ensure that these newly developing countries, the BRICS in the Global South, other emerging economies, are developing ways that are not harmful for the climate, and we're not exacerbating the problem, and moving to green energy — that requires a whole different system of global governance. Yes, it's far more than just aid transfers. It's technology. It's new types of international cooperation. And that indeed — this is just one mega example, I would say, as far as global collective action problems, climate and related planetary boundary, environmental governance challenges are the most obvious global collective action dilemmas — but whether it's on how we're dealing with weapons of mass destruction and violence and terrorism and fragile conflict affected states, or a whole range of issues around artificial intelligence and cyber-tech governance, all of these issues need a United Nations that is competent and capable and able to be a bridge between those with knowledge and technical and financial resources and know-how and those who can offer capacity. 

So, the U.N. is much more than just convening member states. It's much more than the sum of just international civil servants operating through various agencies, programs and funds. It's now a convener of private sector partners, civil society, NGOs, who can be implementing programs, especially in the development and humanitarian space, but mobilizing for change. Social movements feel attached to and part of the United Nations. That's been the big transformation in global governance, which the Pact for the Future and the other instruments absolutely represent. 

But to give you, since you're looking for more concrete details and why they matter, artificial intelligence has come on strong just in the last two years in the U.N. discussions, thanks to the Global Digital Compact. It wasn't even a core chapter until, you know, everybody's attention is turning to these powerful tools, where risk mitigation and preventing, you know, autonomous weapons and public bads emerging, where we can't control the power of these technologies, is as big a concern about harnessing AI for good and being part of addressing the major development challenges of this time. 

And while we're not ready, as an international community, to take a leap towards new bodies — some discussions that we've been writing about, learning from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and how that was, you know, the beginning of the nuclear age, and how we needed to get a control on that in connection with the Cold War at the time — we may, at some not so distant future, need to be thinking along those lines. But as far as important first steps, I referred to the International Panel on Climate Change, bringing the best scientists, people from industry, who can work on green tech. The same arguments hold now, and there's an agreement in the Global Digital Compact for a scientific panel to emerge just in the next 12 months. 

So, you're going to see progress, and having those scientific, best and the brightest minds advising policymakers on next steps — that is a fundamental and critical first step. And then it gets to the main point, which is in a study through the Secretary-General's new AI, artificial intelligence, advisory body, they mapped out that there are six, seven major new initiatives just in the last few years on AI governance. The seven most powerful countries, where many of the tech companies reside, participated and are driving and leading those. There are over 100, 118+ countries that do not participate in any of these fora. That brings together what the U.N. is all about — the only universal membership body, 193 member states. It ensures that these bridges between the Global South-Global North, many bridges within different groupings of states, that need to be overcome just to have a voice. There's going to be this new forum called a global dialog on artificial intelligence. That at least is going to begin to rectify who is at the table in participating in decision making. Otherwise, a subject that I'm sure we're going to turn to soon. the Security Council reform, the dominance by the permanent five members for over 75 years — this is critical that we prevent the same mistakes of the past and the peace and security space to this very critical area on AI and cyber governance. 

Viola: That's great. Thank you. And thanks very much for touching on that Global Digital Compact as well. Thank you.

Paras: Yeah, and shifting gears slightly. In the run up to high-level week, much of the discussion in diplomatic circles and in foreign policy circles was around the conflicts in the Middle East, between Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas, and the war in Ukraine. And there was a sense that, in a way, those conflicts might overshadow UNGA, or at least inform the discussion, and how many states in the Global South and the Global North are framing their diplomatic points. What ended up happening in terms of discussion on those conflicts? Was there any movement on them, particularly given the continued paralysis in the Security Council? 

Richard: You know, on one hand, it's remarkable, once again, that there was consensus achieved around the Pact for the Future and the associated documents. Given the conflicts that you just referred to, there's all kinds of reasons why governments don't trust each other and would not meet.  

And let's just take Ukraine, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, talk openly was always spilling into the press of whether Ukraine could use Western-supplied weapons to tack further into Russia, and the worry that that problem, the war, would spread and bring NATO into the conflict more directly. The same worries in a different setting — the Middle East was at the forefront because of the escalation of fighting between Israel and the southern Lebanon-based Hezbollah movement, and worries now of bringing Iran into the conflict.  

And you know, you could say two things. One is, it's incredible that against that more than challenging backdrop that such instruments were adopted, but that the U.N. was providing its first and foremost role since its creation in 1945 — a peacemaking organization, a place for dialog, wanting diplomacy to dictate how wars will end — and some wars end through military conflict, but the far, far majority, as we see in studies for decades now, as a negotiated settlement, is necessary, and the U.N. first and foremost as a peacemaking supporting organization, and it showed its utility in that regard. 

As it relates, though, to specific outcomes in the summit and where it could lead to new innovations in its fundamental peacemaking but related conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building roles, I refer you to both Chapter Two, a whole dedicated chapter around international peace and security, and a few really important set of ideas on Security Council reform in Actions 39 through 41 — three major, very detailed sets of actions in that final concluding, transforming global governance chapter, Also a full Action dealing with peace building commissions and the related peace building support office and fund architecture, it's called peacebuilding architecture reform, which, by the way, will be followed up immediately by a major peacebuilding architecture review meeting in 2025. And that's a good example of, you know, that momentum won't be lost, but rather specific areas such as the peace building and its upgrade and strengthening its utility, maybe learning from the Human Rights Commission, how it was transformed at a similar summit in 2005 and had new tools such as the universal periodic review to enhance its safeguarding and promotion of human rights role. We could see something similar happen in the not-so-distant future related to the PBC.  

But a final point is that one of the reasons that the chapter two on international peace and security is so detailed, compared to even the other chapters’ very concrete sets of actions in areas such as the next generation of women, peace, and security and youth, peace and security engagement, concrete actions on a top priority of the Secretary-General since the beginning of his tenure in 2017, the area of prevention and focusing on a surge in diplomacy to address many of the festering conflicts today, especially within countries, but often internationalized by the engagement of outside actors. The fact is, there was a New Agenda for Peace, a very important document that was upgraded after 30 years, the original one, 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then the Secretary-General. And I would say that in connection with these conflicts today, from the Middle East to Ukraine, but especially forgotten conflicts that don't get the attention among great powers, your Sudans, the continued problem in eastern DRC and Haiti in the Western Hemisphere — this is the U.N.'s forte. 

Viola: Yeah, we did want to ask you a little bit about Haiti, as a matter of fact. There has been a little bit of confusion of which direction the United States wanted to go on this in the lead up to high-level week. There was talk about the U.S. supporting a transition of the police mission in Haiti that is led by Kenya currently, and is financed primarily by the United States and was sanctioned by the Security Council, but is not under the U.N. umbrella. Now, there is talk that the U.S., in fact, is now backing off of that position and is supporting an extension of the existing structure. Is that how you understand it? Can you just give us a brief state of play on that debate? 

Richard: Great, no, I've been following Haiti since the discussions especially, really began to heat up last year in 2023 and great to see an African country, Kenya, step up and offer its police force to lead, along with a few Caribbean neighboring countries of Haiti. What was astonishing is that the U.N. structure, through the Department of Peace Operations was, for the most in part, bypassed. And I can see the grumblings now and concerns by not only the U.S. government as a whole, but especially the Department of Defense, which has been asked to play logistical support and channel direct financing to the police, the same way that the Department of Peace Operations would offer those types of services to the national contingents, whether military or police, for blue helmet operations in a peacekeeping environment — an area that the U.N. has tremendous expertise. 

Now, in the case of Haiti, and why things have played out the way they have, has so much to do with the very sad and horrific challenges that the U.N. has faced in the case of Haiti, from spreading of cholera to sexual exploitation and abuse. Nobody can discount, and the U.N. has taken measures across the board over recent years to prevent those episodes from happening again. My biggest concern is throwing out the baby with the bathwater. That's such an important conflict management tool, one instrument that the U.N., more than any other, pioneered since the 1950s when peacekeeping was first introduced, will be forgotten and bypassed. And this is no joke, because for over a decade, there hasn't been a new peacekeeping mission. There's pressure for the U.N. to retire existing ones. 

And yet, we see the need is growing in certain parts of the world, Exhibit A) being Haiti, and there were at least four different generations of the U.S. engagement in Haiti. One high point was the last time President Lula was leading his country of Brazil, and the Brazilians led the force commander role, and that, in particular, was seen as a period of stability and hope and promise. So, leadership matters, from the national contingents to the backstopping support role of the U.N., the Special Representative, the Secretary-General, leads on the mediation and working through these conflicts, so that it's much more than just ensuring a ceasefire and some degree of stability, but actually getting on the road to longer term what has often required structural change of a political and economic nature. 

Those are the seeds. This is why we have terms like peace building and sustaining peace. It's so much more than preventing violent conflict, a negative view of peace, but one that is dealing with issues of governance, rule of law and economic, social, even environmental aspects contribute to stability in society. This is what the U.N. and these multi-dimensional peace operations have been designed to undertake. And while we can't discount, again, failures and mistakes that have been made — people should be brought to justice when they have made grave errors that tarnish the reputation of the U.N. — to completely replace it with new coalitions of the willing and efforts that, in the end, the major donor countries like the United States will have to backstop and pay for anyways — why not fix and innovate and strengthen the system that has been around for several decades?  

Viola: Thank you. And just to clarify what happened with the cholera and the sexual abuse. That was actually found to have been that members of the U.N. contingent that inadvertently brought cholera to Haiti, and in the case of the sexual exploitation and abuse, that was found to have been committed by the U.N. forces there. But as you say, there have been so many other contexts where U.N. forces have been very, very effective and potentially perhaps could be again in Haiti.  

Thank you very much. Appreciate that perspective on that. 

Richard: Thank you. No. And at my own time, the U.N.’s operation in Sierra Leone, first and foremost, the blue flag, the blue helmets, are seen as a source of hope, inspiration, confidence building in countries where very few, even, neighboring countries, would want to step in, or when they did, there was a regional ECOWAS, West African force. They committed heinous crimes and had to be replaced by the U.N.-led blue beret. With that point said, I think going in the direction of joint African Union in the U.N., or even regional bodies working with the U.N., there are definite advantages, and it has been tested out in one or two places in East Africa, in Sudan, in recent years. So there's some important lessons there. 

Paras: Thanks so much for that, and we're running short on time. But do you have a final thought as we conclude the episode? 

Richard: Great. No, I'm glad. And then it gives me a chance to turn to Security Council reform, because in one sense, it is signaled, as I said, in three key Actions, 39, 40 and 41, it came out of this body that now will have new momentum — the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. The fact, though, that there was concrete language that Africa has been served historical injustice, and that regions such as the Asia-Pacific and Latin America are underrepresented, the fact that it speaks to needing to modify and avoid the misuse and abuse of the veto power of the Permanent Five in very clear language, the fact that it talks about working towards one consolidated model — this is what we've all been waiting for to at least have text through the IGN. It sounds extraordinary that they haven't gotten to this stage since these debates really reemerged again in a big way at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, but we are where we are. We know the historical reasons why real progress beyond something called working methods, procedural issues, have really been lacking, and so to have wind in the sails of this body a clear direction, to know that the General Assembly is watching very closely what happens there, and is ready to step in if we see continued paralysis of the Security Council. 

There's been something called the uniting for peace resolution since the Korean War in the early 1950s, and it's been innovated in different ways since then, but most recently, the Liechtenstein initiative, which forces countries to defend a veto vote made in the Security Council. We've seen it now multiple times, where China and Russia have had to defend vetoes on issues involving North Korea, even though there had been consensus among the great powers since the early 2000s. Of course, the Ukraine conflict, but even the United States with Israel over the last 12 months.  

It's really important to think about peace and security being a shared responsibility. The peace building architecture was created in 2005 partly because of the failure of the Security Council to be fully proficient in fulfilling its mandate for the promotion, safeguarding international peace and security. So, if the U.N. Security Council is not reformed and changed, you can expect and continue to see innovations elsewhere, maybe the role of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court that exists. 

So, there are a number of steps that will require amendments to the Charter. That's something that did not come up in the Pact for the Future negotiations. But it's time to demystify this idea. We can't possibly get agreement, and you have to bring in national legislatures to amend the Charter. This is exactly what the framers of the Charter knew. Back in 1945, President Truman, the U.S. president at the time, called it an imperfect document, but an important step, and we have to be ready to upgrade and modernize it over time, beginning with this most critical body for enacting international law and fulfilling its collective security role, the U.N. Security Council.  

If we don't get that right, it really ties the hands of the United Nations in other critical areas where it needs to be performing well. But you know, first and foremost, it was established to prevent a third world war, to be a peacemaking organization. The fact that it still exists is an important step, but something we should never be satisfied with. We need to keep it relevant to both current, and what was great about this last week's summit was the focus on future generations. It might be several generations from now that could be benefiting from decisions that are made today and getting us on the right track. 

Certainly the U.N. including its Charter, will need to be upgraded over time. This is a responsibility, I would argue, of every generation, but it's really important, learning from these conflicts that are going on currently, learning from the biggest arguable global governance challenge of our time, climate change, that we're not there yet, in terms of having the capabilities and the ability to execute the vision and the agreements by political leaders in 2015 at the Paris Climate Agreement. We're not there in delivering on this agenda, because it has something to do with not having the right governance structures in place. And this is the important step that was taken a week ago. There's a lot of work to build upon it, and I certainly hope that people, individual citizens, working in concert with their civil society organizations, the private sector, and then, of course, the governments that represent them are going to continue to take seriously this type of agenda, because it's going to require many years of serious, concerted effort ahead. Thank you. 

Paras: Thanks again, Richard. Thank you so much for joining the show and sharing your insights and analysis with us. 

Richard: Thank you. It was a pleasure.

Paras: This episode was co-hosted and produced by me, Paras Shah, and Viola Gienger, with help from Clara Apt.  

Special thanks to Richard Ponzio. You can read all of Just Security’s coverage of the U.N. General Assembly and the Summit of the Future, including Richard's analysis, on our website. 

If you enjoyed this episode, please give us a five-star rating on Apple podcasts or wherever you listen. 

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